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Tinko: Going all the way
BY GEORGE A. HAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP (hereinafter Trinko)1 was unanimous
and the principal opinion was very short;2 yet, the opinion has
already spawned substantial commentary.3 This is appropriate; while
the case involved a very limited aspect of a highly regulated segment
* The Edward Cornell Professor of Law and Professor of Economics,
Cornell University.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Jeremy Morrison, Cornell Law School '07 and Alyssa Hochberg,
Cornell Law School '06, provided assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
2 A concurring opinion was even shorter, taking a mere four
paragraphs to indicate that the plaintiff lacked standing and that the case
should have been dismissed entirely for that reason. Id. at 416-18.
3 In addition to the other articles in this special issue, see John Thorne, A
Categorical Rule Limiting Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Verizon v. Trinko, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 289 (2005); Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Antitrust Trade and
Practice; Is Section 2 of the Sherman Act on Hold?, 231 N.Y. L. J. (2004); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147 (2005);
Kathleen Lavalle, 2004 Legal Perspective: Antitrust and Business Litigation, 68
TEX. B. J. 24 (2005).
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of the economy,4 Justice Scalia's opinion has the potential of affecting
antitrust jurisprudence on a much larger scale. I will leave it to others
to discuss the intended or ideal relationship between the 1996
Telecommunications Act (the 1996 Act) and the antitrust laws and the
nuances of Trinko insofar as it affects the telecommunications
industry. Others may wish to address the standing issue that the
principal opinion elected to ignore. 5 My interest is in the broader
implications of Trinko for section 2 jurisprudence, specifically the
extent to which a monopolist may be required to deal or otherwise
cooperate with a competitor. My basic argument is that Trinko
exposed the soft underbelly of the monopolist's so-called "duty to
deal." While the opinion did not reach a definitive conclusion on how
the doctrine should be reformulated (or even whether it should be
reformulated at all), it planted the seed for a complete overhaul.
When Trinko is taken to its logical conclusion, it may be that the "duty
to deal" has either been eliminated entirely or has been confined to a
very tiny pocket of exceptional situations.
Since the opinion, with all the factual background, is discussed at
length elsewhere, including in some of the other contributions to this
special issue, I will spend only a minute on the preliminaries. The
complaint alleged that Verizon, the incumbent local exchange carrier,
refused to provide certain interconnection services to one or more of its
rivals in order to limit entry and that this violated section 2 of the
Sherman Act as well as several telecommunications-specific statutes.6
4 The case dealt with the telecommunications industry and the
obligation under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 of an incumbent local
exchange carrier to provide access to portions of its network to other firms
seeking to provide local telephone service. The goal of the Act is to assist the
development of competition in local exchange service. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 401.
5 Three of the Justices, although concurring in the judgment, thought
that the case should have been dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff
lacked standing. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 416-18.
6 Amended Complaint for Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP at 1 2-8,
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d
738 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 1:00-CV-01910), rev'd in part sub nom. Verizon
Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir.
2002)(reinstating antitrust claims), rev'd, Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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The trial court had dismissed the entire action for failure to state a
claim but the Second Circuit reinstated the complaint in part, including
the antitrust claim. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the
question of whether the court of appeals had erred in reversing the
district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's antitrust claims.7
The Court first discusses the interaction of the 1996 Act with the
antitrust laws and concludes that the 1996 Act neither preempts the
antitrust laws as they apply to the actions of a local exchange carrier
nor creates any new substantive antitrust standards that govern the
behavior of such carriers.8 This clears the way for a discussion of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act that is to some extent independent of the
regulatory context in which the defendant's alleged actions occurred.
II. LIABILITY AND EXCEPTIONS TO LIABILITY
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
With respect to the Sherman Act, the Court notes first that section
2 does not create a status offense; the mere possession of monopoly
power is not a violation.9 There is nothing new here. Despite some
wishful ruminations to the contrary, Judge Hand in Alcoa made it clear
that "to monopolize" means more than simply to possess monopoly
power. ° As Justice Scalia notes, in addition to the possession of
monopoly power in a relevant market, the offense of unlawful
monopolization requires "the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident."" Moreover, the potential ambiguity in what constitutes
willful acquisition or maintenance has been clarified in numerous
opinions so that it is now understood that the "willful acquisition or
7 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 405.
8 Id., at 406-07.
9 Id. at 407-08.
10 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
1 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
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maintenance" of the monopoly must involve conduct which is not
merely "willful," as opposed to unintentional, but which can properly
be described as something other than "competition on the merits." 12
Significantly, the Trinko opinion notes also that the charging of
monopoly prices does not convert the mere possession of monopoly
power into an antitrust violation.13 While this will not come as news to
experienced antitrust practitioners in the U.S.,'4 it provides a convenient
and unequivocal citation of particular interest to those who practice in
other jurisdictions (such as the EU) where, at least in principle, the
charging of monopoly prices can violate the European counterpart to
section 2.15 More importantly, as will be discussed below, it supports the
claim that Trinko marks a more radical reinterpretation of traditional
antitrust doctrine than may initially be apparent.
A. The right to refuse and the Colgate doctrine
If section 2 is not a status offense but requires some kind of
illegitimate conduct aimed at acquiring or maintaining monopoly
power, what kind of conduct qualifies? Specifically, for purposes of
dealing with the allegations in Trinko, can a dominant firm violate
section 2 by refusing to deal or in other ways refusing to cooperate
12 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
605 n.32 (1985) (quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
1 626b at 78 (1978)).
13 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
14 See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d
Cir. 1979).
15 RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 635-6 (4th ed. 2001) (quoting the
decision of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Case 27/26,
United Brands Co. v. Comm'n, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 9 250, "charging a price
which is excessive because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value
of the product supplied is . . . an abuse"). The European counterpart to
section 2 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. This may at least
partially explain the apparent diversity of the approaches of the U.S. and the
EU, especially in light of the EU's historic dedication to avoiding markets
divided along national boundaries, which has led to actions when a dominant
firm charges a higher price in one part of Europe than in others and takes
steps to support this price discrimination by preventing arbitrage.
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with actual or potential competitors? Justice Scalia quotes a well-
known passage from the Court's 1919 opinion in Colgate: "[t]hus, as a
general matter, the Sherman Act 'does not restrict the long recognized
right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal[."" 6 Oddly, Justice Scalia omitted the
important preamble to the so-called "Colgate doctrine." The full
sentence from Colgate says, "[ifn the absence of any purpose to create or
maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right
of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal[.]" 1 7
What the quoted passage (including the preamble) has generally
been understood to mean is that a firm with monopoly power can be
liable for refusing to deal with a customer that is also an actual or
potential competitor of the monopolist (typically, but not always, in
some downstream market), and the product or service that is
withheld is a critical input for the customer to be able to compete
effectively against the monopolist.18 Thus, for example, the owner of
the only stadium in a metropolitan area suitable for playing a
professional sport may choose (without having to defend its decision
as based on legitimate efficiency or related concerns) to allow one
team to rent the stadium but deny the request of a second team (a
potential entrant into the league) also to rent the stadium, so long as
the stadium owner does not have any equity interest in the incumbent
16 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
17 Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307 (emphasis added).
18 Thus, in most refusal cases there are two separate markets-an
upstream market in which the defendant is a monopolist in the production of a
product or service and a downstream market in which the dominant firm uses
the product generated in the upstream market as an input to produce a
separate product or service. The situation in the Aspen Skiing case referred to by
the Court was unusual in that there was only a single market-that for skiing
in Aspen-and the defendant refused to help its smaller rival to compete by
declining to cooperate in the sale of certain kinds of combination tickets. See
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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team 19 and acts unilaterally.2" On the other hand, a firm that
participates in both the upstream market and the downstream
market, and has a monopoly in the upstream market, may be exposed
to antitrust risk by using its monopoly to deny a critical input to a
potential competitor in the downstream market if the refusal to deal
would allow the monopolist to maintain or achieve a monopoly in the
downstream market as well.21
So far, so good. The Colgate doctrine tells us there is no general
duty to deal but there may be exceptions when the refusal allows a
dominant firm to achieve or maintain a monopoly in some market.
But if this was all there was to it, the plaintiffs in Trinko would still be
in the ballgame. According to the allegations, the victims of Verizon's
refusal to deal with respect to portions of its network were potential
competitors of Verizon, and Verizon's refusal to deal with those
potential competitors allowed Verizon to maintain its overall
monopoly in local exchange service.22 The Court clearly believes that
the Sherman Act leaves an even narrower window for plaintiffs since
it asks "whether the allegations of respondent's complaint fit within
the existing exceptions ..."23 If the only facts needed to qualify for an
"existing exception" were a) that the victim does or would compete
19 See Interface Group, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 816 F.2d 9
(1st Cir. 1987); PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 9I773e at
210-13 (2d ed. 2002).
20 If the owner of the stadium has an agreement with one team that it
will not lease the stadium to any potential competitors of the team, the
agreement may violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Hecht v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
21 A few courts have held that a monopolist could violate section 2 if in
an upstream market it withheld a critical input merely in order to gain a
competitive advantage in the downstream market despite little likelihood of
also achieving a monopoly in the downstream market. See Berkey Photo, Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979). Contra, Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993), which undermined this type of
leveraging theory by merging it with attempted monopolization, as reflected
in justice Scalia's footnote reference. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415 n.4.
22 See Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 11 2-8.
23 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
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against the defendant and b) that the refusal to deal will allow the
defendant to maintain its monopoly, this question would be
superfluous.
B. Aspen's duty to deal
What else then is required in order for the plaintiff to qualify for
one of the "existing exceptions" to the general principle that there is
no duty to deal? The Court refers to Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp.24 as the "leading case for section 2 liability
based on a refusal to cooperate with a rival," and, in passing,
describes Aspen Skiing as "at or near the outer boundary of section 2
liability."25 Acknowledging the warning that Aspen Skiing may be a
risky precedent for plaintiffs to rely on in the future, we can
nevertheless ask what was special about the situation in Aspen Skiing
that allowed it to qualify as an exception to the general principle that
a seller (even a monopolist) does not have a duty to deal.
The Court focuses on two factors that were present in Aspen
Skiing. First, the defendant's refusal to deal took the form of a
withdrawal from previous voluntary participation in a joint venture.26
The Aspen Court was apparently willing to infer (or willing to allow a
jury to infer) from the previous voluntary participation that the joint
venture had been profitable for the defendant and that therefore
termination of its participation suggested "a willingness to forsake
short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end."27 Second, the
24 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
25 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-409.
26 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 608, 610-11.
27 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. In principle, there could have been alternative
explanations for why the defendant might have wished to cease cooperation
with the plaintiff. Circumstances could have changed so that what was once a
profitable collaboration was no longer so. Alternatively, defendant may have
learned from its experience with the all-mountain pass that it was better off
with 100% of the revenues from a three-mountain pass (which would involve
only the defendant's mountains) than with some percentage of the revenues
from a four-mountain pass. The Aspen Court did not make it clear whether the
latter, if true, would qualify as a "legitimate business reason" for refusing to
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fact that the defendant refused to renew its involvement even though
it was compensated at a price equivalent to its normal retail price
"revealed a distinctly anticompetitive bent."28 Presumably the Court
believed that, like the cessation of previously voluntary cooperation,
the refusal of the defendant to renew its involvement at what was
presumably a profitable price meant that the jury was free to infer
that the defendant was prepared to forgo immediate profits to
achieve an anticompetitive result.
Of course, neither of these specific factors was present in Trinko.
Prior to the 1996 Act there had been no voluntary cooperation
between Verizon and AT&T, Trinko's competitive local carrier, and
the price set under the regulatory regime created by the statute was a
cost-based price bearing no particular relationship to any "retail"
price that Verizon had ever charged or might charge were it free to
set its own prices. 29 Since the Court in Trinko was ruling on
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, the Court must have
decided that there was nothing else in the allegations that would
allow a jury to infer that Verizon was "forsak[ing] short-term profits
to achieve an anticompetitive end." 30
participate in the joint venture but it is hard to see why it shouldn't qualify.
This comparison could favor nonparticipation in the all-mountain pass
without regard to any expectation that the plaintiff would leave the market or
the defendant would be able to increase prices.
28 Id. (describing the Court's rationale in Aspen).
29 See id. at 402, 405-06.
30 Id. at 409. At first blush, it might seem that a cost-based price (if
accurately calculated) would provide adequate short-term incentive for
Verizon to cooperate since, if the price covered the relevant costs (including a
"normal" profit), Verizon would be better off. Then one might conclude that
Verizon's failure to cooperate could not have been motivated by legitimate
concerns about short-term profits. But what was presumably relevant for
Verizon was not its accounting cost but its "opportunity cost," since sales
made by Verizon's competitors in local exchange service would normally be
sales that otherwise would have been made by Verizon. Hence, assuming
Verizon's retail price was profitable, additional sales by Verizon's
competitors (using some of Verizon's network) could result in smaller profits
for Verizon, notwithstanding the fact that Verizon would be "compensated"
by competitors for the use of its facilities. See id. at 405.
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Apparently having already decided that Trinko did not fit within
the limited exception recognized in Aspen Skiing, the Court goes on
to suggest a factor that makes the case different from Aspen Skiing in
a more fundamental way; viz., that the defendant in Aspen Skiing
refused to provide its competitor with a product it already sold at
retail, i.e., lift tickets. 31 Verizon, in contrast, had never, prior to the
1996 Act, offered to lease access to any part of its network to any
other entities and, presumably, would not have done so but for the
1996 Act. This observation by the Court is potentially significant. In
highlighting this difference between Aspen and Trinko, the Court
may be creating a safe harbor for vertically integrated firms that
have never sold the intermediate input in arm's-length
transactions. 32
C. Essential facilities
Having determined that Verizon's insufficient assistance to rivals
is not "a recognized antitrust claim under this Court's existing duty to
deal precedents," the opinion goes on to suggest that the outcome
would be no different if the Court "considered to be established law
the 'essential facilities' doctrine crafted by some lower courts. . .. "33
Even if the Court recognized the doctrine, an indispensable element
needed to invoke the doctrine is "the unavailability of access to the
31 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 585 (1985). The Court notes that the other
well-known duty to deal case decided by the Court, Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), also involved a situation where the defendant
was in the business of providing power transmission to some customers but
denied it to certain customers that threatened to compete with it.
32 Interestingly, the most famous Australian case involving refusal to
deal involved precisely such a situation. The monopolist manufacturer of Y-
bar, a product required to make steel fence posts, had never sold the product
at arm's length, yet the plaintiff successfully argued that the defendant's
refusal to supply Y-bar on reasonable terms was a misuse of market power in
that it allowed the defendant to maintain its dominance in the downstream
market for steel fence posts. Queensland Wire Indus. Pty. Ltd. v. Broken Hill
Proprietary Co. Ltd. (1989) 167 C.L.R. 177 available at www.austlii.edu.au
/au /cases/cth/highct/167clr177.html.
33 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410.
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'essential facilities,'"34 and here the regulatory structure provided an
alternative route for the plaintiff to achieve access.
For future plaintiffs the Court's lukewarm reference to the
essential facilities doctrine is notable. While the Court finds no need
"either to recognize it or to repudiate it here," 35 future plaintiffs are
on notice that the doctrine may not receive a warm embrace should it
ever become critical to the outcome in a case. Arguably, however,
nothing of substance is lost. Putting to one side some of the
fundamental problems inherent in the doctrine (discussed below), it
is in any event superfluous.36 Any claim that would be viable under
the essential facilities doctrine, as it has been interpreted, should also
survive under a straightforward interpretation of traditional section 2
jurisprudence-a defendant, in refusing to provide access to the
essential facility, is using its monopoly power either to fend off
competition in the market where it enjoys a monopoly 37 or, more
typically, to maintain or achieve monopoly in a second, downstream
market. 38 The one potentially unique contribution of an essential
facilities doctrine would be one that has been foreclosed by the
developed law, viz., a situation where the monopolist denies access to
one or more competitors in a market in which the defendant does not
participate. 39 This would make the statute more similar to the "abuse
of a dominant position" statutes that exist in lieu of a monopolization
statute in many jurisdictions such as the EU.40
34 Id. at411.
35 Id.
36 See Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1989).
37 See Aspen Skiing Co., 475 U.S. 585 (1985).
38 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
Alternatively, if the essential facility is controlled by a number of firms
through some kind of industry-wide joint venture, section 1 should be fully
adequate to deal with the refusal to grant access to an individual competitor.
39 Official Airline Guide, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1980).
40 Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 82, Dec. 22, 2002,
O.J. (C 325).
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Finally, having decided that the facts in Trinko fit neither the
established exceptions to the general principle that a monopolist does
not have a duty to cooperate with its competitors nor the essential
facilities doctrine, the Court notes that traditional antitrust principles
do not "justify adding the present case to the few existing exceptions
from the proposition that there is no duty to aid competitors,"
because of the pervasive federal regulation that governs
telecommunications suppliers and that provides an adequate
substitute for antitrust enforcement. 41 As the Court notes, the
disadvantaged rival sought and received a remedy from the Federal
Communications Commission by following the procedures that were
set up under the 1996 Act.42 Indeed, the Court believes not only that
federal regulation is a substitute for antitrust in this area but also that
it is the preferred alternative given the complexities inherent in what
would, in the Court's view, be continued supervision of a complex
antitrust decree. 43 The discussion below focuses on the specific
problem of continuing supervision. The interplay of antitrust and
regulation is discussed elsewhere in this special issue.44
To sum up, a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act was not
stated in Trinko for some combination of the following reasons:
1. there was no established pattern of cooperation with rivals from
which Verizon withdrew;45
2. there was nothing else in the complaint that would support the
conclusion that Verizon's purpose was to eliminate competition
and preserve its monopoly as opposed to simply maximizing
short-term profits;46
41 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.
42 Id.
43 See id. at 414-15.
See, eg., Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation in a
Deregulatory Era, and Roger D. Blair & Christine A. Piette, The Interface of
Antitrust and Regulation: Trinko in the Winter 2005 issue of The Antitrust
Bulletin.
45 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
46 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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3. Verizon had never sold access to pieces of its network to anyone
prior to the 1996 Act 47 (and presumably would not have done so
but for the 1996 Act);
4. the 1996 Act provided an adequate regulatory remedy to a disap-
pointed competitor;48 and
5. mandating access via the Sherman Act would require ongoing judi-
cial supervision of a complex decree; a dedicated regulatory agency
is a more efficient monitor of the defendant's compliance. 49
III. AFTER TRINKO: THE MONOPOLIST'S DUTY
AND THE TERMS OF THE DEAL
Some of the factors identified above are fairly specific to the
regulatory context and will have little general application to the
unregulated sectors of the economy, so we may have to do some
extrapolation to work out whether Trinko has more general
application. I have already discussed one possible generally
applicable "bright line" rule that may emerge from Trinko, i.e., that a
vertically integrated defendant is not required to provide access to an
intermediate input that it has never "sold" at arm's length.5 0 What
other generalizations are possible?
To address this question, consider the following hypothetical.
Defendant (M) is vertically integrated and is the only manufacturer of
47 See Brief for Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, supra note 6.
48 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
49 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415.
'4 If there is to be such a bright line rule, there may still be debate about
when it would apply. One can imagine a situation in which a vertically
integrated firm formally transfers an input from one division of the company
to another, recording a transfer price in the process even though it has never
sold at arm's length. The plaintiff in such a situation might try to argue that
since there are such transfers, it is entitled to be able to buy the input on the
same terms as it is now "sold" to the downstream division. The plaintiff will
seek to distinguish Trinko by arguing that in Trinko there was not even any
kind of transfer transaction with respect to network access-Verizon used the
entire network to provide, and never "priced out" even for internal purposes,
individual elements of the network. But accepting this argument simply
invites vertically integrated firms to manipulate the transfer price so that
transfers take place at very high prices.
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an input (I) that is used in the production of some downstream
product (D) for which there are no good substitutes. 51 To avoid the
argument that there is no duty to deal where the monopolist has
never sold at arm's length, we will assume that I is produced in a
wholly owned subsidiary of M and that, from time to time, M has
made sales of I on the open market. (For convenience, we might
assume that I has other uses besides the production of D and that
these arm's-length sales have been for one or more of these other
uses. However, these assumptions are not necessary for the analysis.)
Having a monopoly in the supply of I, M naturally has charged a
monopoly price any time it has made arm's-length sales of I. In
addition, because of its control of I, M has also generally enjoyed a
monopoly in the production of D and has charged monopoly prices
whenever it has made sales of D.
Now, along comes another firm (C) that sees how much profit M
has been making on sales of D and concludes that, if only it can
acquire the critical input (I) at a "reasonable" price, it will be able to
compete with M in the downstream market for sales of D. C asks M to
supply it with I on reasonable terms and M refuses. C sues under
section 2. Prior to Trinko, if the case had gone to the jury, the jury
would have been instructed according to Otter Tail and Aspen Skiing
that, while M is under no general duty to cooperate with C, it may not
use its monopoly power in one market to retain a monopoly in a
second market.52 It may, however, refuse to deal with C so long as it
has a legitimate reason for doing so (without being clear on what
"counts" as a legitimate business reason). Now, we can ask, what
does Trinko tell us about how such cases might be handled in the
future?
The answer, I believe, is that Trinko forces us to confront and
bring out into the open an issue that has often been ignored in the
discussion of the duty to cooperate or the duty to deal, viz., the terms
on which cooperation or related transactions will take place. The
51 To avoid confusion, we will assume at this point that the input does
not enjoy any intellectual property protection.
52 See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) and
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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issue has also generally been ignored when refusals have been
considered under the essential facilities doctrine. The traditional way
of dealing with duty to deal cases has been to ask whether the
defendant had a "legitimate business reason" for the refusal. 53
Absent a legitimate business reason, the presumption would be that
the purpose (and likely effect) of the refusal was to eliminate a
competitor either in the principal market, as in Aspen Skiing, or in the
downstream market, as in Otter Tail. Hence, the defendant might be
forgoing short-run profits but these would be recouped by the
additional profits that the defendant expects to earn after the
plaintiff's demise, when the defendant should be in a position to
charge monopoly prices without being undermined by a
competitor.54
However, the dichotomy between "legitimate business reason"
and anticompetitive intent is more complicated. To understand the
complexity, suppose that, when asked about his willingness to deal
with C, M explains as follows:
Of course I don't want to sell to C. Currently (because of my control of I),
I do not face any competition in the sale of D and I charge a monopoly
price for D. When C says that he wants to buy I from me, he means that
he wants to buy it at a reasonable price, viz., a price approximating my
incremental costs for the production of I. But if I sell to C at a reasonable
price, C will be able to undercut my current price for D. So either I will
lose my dominant share of the D market or, to retain my dominant
share, I will have to cut the price of D to a level which eliminates most or
53 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 597.
54 One must be cautious with respect to the reference to "short-run
profits." Even in competitive markets, firms are assumed to try to maximize
profits over the long run (otherwise no firm would ever invest in long-lasting
capital equipment). So the distinction one is trying to draw is that between
conduct which maximizes profits under the current competitive conditions on
the one hand and conduct which has as its goal the elimination of competition
on the other, presumably allowing the firm to increase prices and achieve
enhanced monopoly profits. Therefore when we say that there was no
legitimate business reason, we mean that the conduct would not make sense
(i.e., would not be profitable) but for the expectation of enhanced monopoly
profits following the demise of the competitor. This in effect is the
"recoupment" test now used in predatory pricing cases. Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
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all of my monopoly profits.55 So I do not want to sell to C at a reasonable
price.
Of course I would be willing to sell I to C at a monopoly price. Indeed,
my economist friends tell me that, if I choose the monopoly price care-
fully, I should be able to earn approximately the same profits regardless
of whether I retain all the D business (in which case I earn the profits on
the sale of D) or whether C takes over a portion of my D business (in
which case I earn the profits on the sales of I to C). Either way, consumers
would not experience any significant change in the price of D.5, Therefore
my reason for not selling to C is simply that he is not willing to pay the
monopoly price for I. I believe that is a "legitimate business reason."
The situation therefore is one in which M is trying to eliminate
any competition from a competitor that M would be "subsidizing"
with an artificially low price for the critical input I. But if M can
charge enough for I that it makes the same profits even if C captures
a significant share of the D business, then M has no need (and
presumably no desire) to "eliminate" C except perhaps in a few
pathological situations where M still has a long run interest in
eliminating C as a competitor.5 7
55 The most optimistic (legal) scenario for a defendant would be some
kind of oligopoly equilibrium in which prices would remain well above the
competitive level but M and C would share the market. But this would be
only a short run equilibrium; if M is required to sell I to any potential
competitor at a reasonable price, the monopoly profits that M heretofore
earned in the sale of D would eventually dissipate completely.
56 There will not be any significant reduction in the price of D even if C
takes sales away from M because C's costs reflect the high price it must pay
for I. This conclusion would change only if C's own costs of converting I into
D were so much lower than M's that it could pay the monopoly price for I
and still sell D at a price less than what M has been charging.
57 For example, suppose, contrary to fact, that the plaintiff in Aspen
Skiing had plans to develop several new ski areas in and around Aspen which
would eventually cause the defendant to lose its dominant position. And
assume further that these plans would be viable so long as the plaintiff could
remain in business in the short run, even at a very high price for "sharing"
the defendant's facilities. Or suppose that the municipal retail distributor in
Otter Tail, which sought to obtain wholesale power from or through Otter
Tail, had long range plans to build its own generating and long-distance
transmission facilities, threatening an end to Otter Tail's dominance in the
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In light of this evidence, how will the plaintiff fare after Trinko?
Put differently, after Trinko, the question arises of how to state the
monopolist's obligation, or how to articulate what qualifies as a
legitimate business reason for a refusal to deal. Consider the
following possibilities as to M's obligations:
(a) M must offer to sell to C at a reasonable price, i.e., a cost-based or
competitive price;
(b) M must offer to sell to C but can charge a price that does not require
M to forgo any of the profits it currently earns from the sale of D;
(c) M must offer to sell to C, but M can set any price it wishes; or,
(d) M can do whatever it wants, including an outright refusal to deal
with C.
As between (a) and (b), Trinko seems to rule out (a). Trinko provides
one explicit rationale for not requiring a firm to sell at a competitive
price and suggests a second.58 The explicit reason given in Trinko is the
difficulty in supervising an ongoing obligation to sell at a competitive
price.59 This has two components. First, a court would have to decide
on a reasonable price, a task for which general purpose courts (as
opposed to specialized regulatory agencies with dedicated staffs of
accountants and economists) are ill-suited and which courts have
historically been reluctant to undertake.60 Second, the very fact that the
entire region, but that a refusal to deal with the municipal distributor in the
short run would render the longer range plans nonviable. In both cases there
may be no "price" for access which would make the dominant firm
indifferent. Even in a Trinko situation, it is conceivable that Verizon might
fear that partial competitors, such as AT&T, might eventually replicate the
whole of Verizon's local exchange network, thereby eliminating any
dependence on Verizon, ignoring the regulatory framework, and eliminating
Verizon's ability to earn monopoly profits.
58 See Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
-9 Id. at 414.
60 The point was put most poetically by Circuit Judge Taft in Addyston:
It is true that there are some cases in which the courts, mistak-
ing, as we conceive, the proper limits of the relaxation of the
rules for determining the unreasonableness of restraints of trade,
have set sail on a sea of doubt, and have assumed the power to
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defendant would have to deal at a reasonable price would provide a
strong motivation to attempt to evade the obligation. Therefore, the
court must be prepared not only to set the price of access but also to
police the ongoing business relationship to be sure that the defendant
does not come up with some indirect way of avoiding its obligation.6'
(This has also been a problematic aspect of the essential facilities
doctrine. It is one thing to assert that a firm controlling an essential
facility is required to provide access to potential competitors but,
absent special circumstances, the requirement to provide access is
meaningless without some underlying criteria for determining and
policing the terms on which access must be provided.)
say, in respect to contracts which have no other purpose and no
other consideration on either side than the mutual restraint of
the parties, how much restraint of competition is in the public
interest, and how much is not.
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283-4 (6th Cir. 1898). In
some of the traditional cases, e.g., United States v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St.
Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), arguably the Court required merely that the joint
venture owners of the facility not discriminate against other railroads that
sought to become partners. But even a "do not discriminate" decree will incur
complications when some time has elapsed between the setting of the price
for the original owners and the petition for access by newcomers and even
more complications when the original owners have incurred risks that the
newcomers have not or have incurred to a lesser degree.
61 Imagine what would have happened in Aspen Skiing if the court had
attempted to enforce a long-term decree requiring the defendant to cooperate
with plaintiff on a combined ticket. Are they required to agree on the price of
the ticket and what happens if they cannot agree? (The defendant, in order to
boost sales of its own three-mountain ticket, would want the price of the all-
mountain ticket to be relatively high; the plaintiff would want the price for the
all-mountain pass to be attractive as compared to the price of defendant's
three-mountain pass.) How would the revenues be shared? Who would be
responsible for promoting the all-mountain ticket and how would the costs of
promotion be allocated? How might the right terms change over time and what
mechanism would facilitate ongoing adjustment of the terms? Negotiations
could legitimately break down on all these issues but would be much more
likely to break down when the defendant does not really want to cooperate
with the plaintiff in the first place. Fortunately for the courts (but perhaps not
for Aspen skiers), some time after the lawsuit had concluded, the defendant
bought the fourth mountain from the successor to the plaintiff. Aspen Highlands
Ski Area Sold, to Open Tuesday, RocKy MouNTA NEws, Dec. 12, 1993, at 43a.
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The second possible reason for rejecting (a) is suggested by the
introductory discussion in Trinko where the Court reminds us that
"the mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant
charging of monopoly prices is not only not unlawful, it is an
important element of the free market system." 62 The reference to the
charging of monopoly prices would usually involve the basic
situation in which a monopolist in a single market simply charges the
profit-maximizing monopoly price (and naturally refuses to sell to
any entity that will not agree to pay that price). But there is no reason
that the same general principle would not apply just because the firm
is active in two markets, even though allowing the firm to charge a
monopoly price for the upstream product may make it impossible for
purchasers of the input to compete effectively against the monopolist
in a downstream market. 63 If the Sherman Act cannot be used to
regulate price in single, i.e., non-integrated, markets, there is no
logical argument for trying to use antitrust to regulate price in
vertically linked markets.
Moreover, allowing an unintegrated monopolist to charge
monopoly prices but requiring a vertically integrated monopolist to
sell the monopolized input at a cost-based price can create a
significant distortion in the decision of the monopolist about whether
to become vertically integrated in the first place. An integrated firm
that could serve the downstream market more efficiently by virtue of
the integration might nevertheless eschew integration if being
vertically integrated would cause the firm to have to give up the
monopoly profits it is otherwise legally entitled to earn.
If we reject (a) as an option, we are left with (b), (c), and (d). There
is no practical difference between (c) and (d). If M can choose any
price it likes, there is no reason to actually refuse. M can simply
62 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406.
63 Technically, if the potential competitor is no less efficient at producing
the downstream product than the vertically integrated firm, it should be able
to pay the monopoly price for the input and compete against the vertically
integrated firm in the downstream market, while still earning a competitive
return. However, despite the appearance of competition, consumers will pay
the same as they would have had there been no downstream entry.
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choose a price at which no rational competitor would want to buy.
Hence, while (c) requires at least the appearance of being willing to
deal, as a practical matter, (c) allows M not to deal if it doesn't want
to. So well-counseled firms will not refuse outright but can choose a
price which has the same practical effect as an outright refusal.
The difference between (b) and (c) is that (b) leaves open the
possibility of catching those few pathological cases where M has a
long run interest in making sure that C is not viable even if M is not
required to subsidize C's participation in the downstream market. It
corresponds to the "no economic sense" standard advocated by the
United States in its amicus briefs; i.e., the refusal to supply C would
not make any economic sense except for the fact that it causes C's
demise.64 However, one must question whether a general purpose
court really has the ability to discriminate between (b) and (c) in all
but the most obvious cases (such as the refusal of the Aspen defendant
effectively to sell lift tickets to the plaintiff at retail prices).
As indicated above, the well-counseled defendant will not simply
refuse to deal with C, but will choose a price that makes competition
from C not viable. Thus the court would be required to decide that
the price being offered by M is significantly above the profit-
maximizing level. In Economics 101, students are taught that the
profit-maximizing price can easily be identified by finding the output
at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost and then finding the
point on the demand curve that yields the price associated with that
level of output. But demand curves, marginal revenue curves, and
marginal cost curves are not normally found in the company's
internal documents, as anyone who has been involved in a predatory
pricing case can attest.
Moreover, unlike the situation in predatory pricing cases, where a
price below variable cost serves as a "simple" bright-line test for
anticompetitive conduct, since such a price cannot be rational save for
its long-run adverse impact on competition, there is no corresponding
simple bright-line test for when a price is too high to possibly be
64 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Comm'n as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15-20, Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (No. 02-682).
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profit maximizing. If courts have problems determining whether
price is above or below average variable costs, they will certainly
have difficulty in determining whether price is above or below the
profit-maximizing level.
Therefore, either courts will be engaged in the complex and error-
filled process of distinguishing between profit-maximizing prices and
prices that are intended simply to eliminate a competitor or the (b)
standard will collapse into the (c) standard. The former has the added
problem that, if courts cannot be counted on to get the calculus
correct, firms are left with substantial uncertainty as to what price
they can legitimately charge for access to a critical input. Therefore, if
we accept the proposition that the monopolist should not be required
to deal at a reasonable, i.e., cost-based, price, it is not a big leap to the
next step of letting the monopolist sell at any price it chooses or even
refuse to deal outright.65
Of course, allowing the monopolist to charge the monopoly price
will eliminate the vast majority of cases in which the monopolist
might otherwise not wish to assist its competitor. Note also that
abandoning the duty to deal has the consequence of clearing up the
confusion in the lower courts about whether a firm that owes its
monopoly in the upstream market to intellectual property protection
is exempt from any duty to deal under section 2.66 There was never a
strong analytic case to be made for the proposition that monopolies
based on intellectual property should be treated differently for these
purposes than any other kind of monopoly. Abandoning the duty to
deal in all cases eliminates the disparity.
65 Alternatively, we could preserve a small piece of the duty to deal by
prohibiting discrimination against potential competitors. If the monopolist
elects to sell the upstream product at all, it may not discriminate in price
against a downstream competitor. And, of course, the same non-
discrimination approach would remain in cases brought under section 1
against joint ventures, recognizing, as discussed above, that even a
straightforward nondiscrimination standard will pose enforcement challenges.
66 I refer here to the apparently different standards expressed by the appel-
late courts in the Kodak and Independent Service Organizations cases. Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Independent
Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322,1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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IV. CONCLUSION
There is a sense in which Trinko contains more answers than there
were questions. Even ignoring the plaintiff's questionable standing,
the special regulatory context in which the defendant's refusal to
cooperate took place could have served to protect the defendant from
antitrust liability. But whether it be mere dicta or material that is a
substantive part of the holding in the case, parts of the opinion
suggest that the Court has adopted a position on the rights and
responsibilities that section 2 bestows on a dominant firm that will
have a significant impact on the viability of future litigation involving
the refusal of a dominant firm to sell a critical input to, or otherwise
cooperate with, a potential competitor. If one follows the path carved
out in the opinion to its logical conclusion, there will be few, if any,
exceptions to the principle that a firm, even a monopolist, has
absolutely no duty to sell to or cooperate with a potential competitor,
and future references to the essential facilities doctrine will be
relegated to historical interest.
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